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Abstract  
To study the effect of the legal system on the cost of external financing, we examine 
the degree of underpricing of the IPOs by foreign companies listed in the U.S. We find that 
firms from highly corrupted countries have larger IPO underpricing. The quality of the home 
countries’ public law enforcement reduces the degree of IPO underpricing. In particular, the 
criminal sanction for violations of securities laws is the most significant factor in reducing 
underpricing. The evidence shows that even when a non-U.S. firm meets sophisticated U.S. 
regulations and goes public in a U.S. exchange, the degree of underpricing is still influenced 
by the legal and judicial system in the home country. Following La Porta et al. (2000a), we 
provide evidence against the functional convergence hypothesis (Coffee, 1999 and 2002). 
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At a certain stage of its life cycle, a company may have to resort to external financing. 
One form of raising capital externally is to sell stocks to investors through initial public 
offering (IPO). Raising capital through an IPO is a corporate milestone that may help 
position a firm for future growth and strengthen its competitive position. However, 
conducting an IPO is an expensive and time consuming process, Underpricing is the best-
known cost associated with IPO. Ritter (1987) documents that underpricing is the highest 
cost in the IPO process and exists in every nation and every stock market (Ritter, 1998). 
There are different theoretical perspectives to address the IPO underpricing phenomenon. 
However, studies focusing on the legal reasons of IPO underpricing still remain scarce, so 
understanding the factors that influence underpricing across firms and across countries helps 
shed light on firms’ decisions to go public.  
Law and finance literature suggest that legal systems do have important effects in 
corporate finance. Researchers have shown that the different legal systems across countries 
affect financial market development (La Porta et al., 1997, 2006; Djankov et al., 2008 ), 
corporate governance (La Porta et al., 2000a), dividend policy (La Porta et al., 2000b), 
corporate valuation (La Porta et al., 2002), and market cost of equity (Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2002). Related to IPO, Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (2010) posit that strong legal 
system is a double-edged sword for firms raising external financing through IPO. Whereas 
strong legal systems make it easier to raise capital, they also strengthen the position of 
outside investors, leading to reduced entrepreneurs’ control on their companies. However, 
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it’s also questionable that outsiders will exercise the rights granted to them by the legal 
system when they have low ownership in the company. At the IPO, insiders can generate 
excess demand from outsiders by underpricing, and that excess demand may lead to a more 
dispersed ownership structure with less active monitoring by outside investors. Consistent 
with this conjecture, Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (2010) find that underpricing is higher when 
firms go public in a country with a stronger legal system. 
However, Engelen and van Essen (2010) suggest, strong legal systems decrease ex ante 
uncertainty by reducing investors’ fear of expropriation, strong legal systems might be 
associated with lower underpricing. Peng and Jiang (2010) argue that in countries with better 
investor protection, the benefits of concentrated family ownership may outweigh the costs, 
and firms with concentrated family ownership have little need to underprice shares at the 
IPO to maintain control. Because these views are not mutually exclusive, the ultimate impact 
of legal systems on underpricing remains an empirical issue.  
On the other hand, over the past few decades, many foreign companies made their IPO 
debuts in the United States. While such listings provide a more convenient channel to 
achieve global diversification, previous studies in the literature show that foreign firms also 
benefit. For example, Bruner, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) show that foreign firms 
making IPOs in the U.S. experience approximately the same underpricing as U.S. domestic 
IPOs. They argue that the risk of foreign IPOs arising from asymmetric information and high 
country risk are offset by characteristics that reduce their risk relative to U.S. domestic IPOs. 
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Bruner, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) further show that there is no significant difference 
in underpricing between emerging and developed market IPOs made in the U.S. 
The IPO literature also provides evidence that some offer- and firm-specific 
characteristics such as industry and size affect valuation (e.g., Aggarwal, Bhagat, and 
Rangan, 2009). In particular, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004), document that companies 
from around the world that cross list in U.S. are associated with valuation premiums relative 
to other firms from their home countries that do not cross list. Their results are consistent 
with the functional convergence hypothesis (Coffee, 1999, 2002). 
Unlike Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004), this study attempts to investigate what 
determine the valuation of U.S.-listed foreign IPOs. Specifically, it investigates whether 
some commonly used country-level legal variables affect the cross-section of IPO valuation. 
We analyze a sample of 364 non-U.S. firms’ IPOs (including ADR/ADS IPOs) in the 
U.S. exchange markets from 1991 to 2008. The empirical results suggest that IPOs for firms 
from highly corrupted countries are associated with more underpricing. With respect to legal 
enforcement, we find that IPO underpricing is lower if the home country has more efficient 
public law enforcement. Among the five components of the public law enforcement, criminal 
sanction is the most significant factor in reducing the IPO underpricing. The association 
between IPO underpricing and the home-country’s private law enforcement, however, tends 
to be statistically insignificant. We do not find a significant relationship between IPO 
underpricing and the home-country’s legal protection level. One possible explanation is 
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investors assess whether the home-country’s legal system effectively takes actions against 
expropriations of shareholders, while the presence of legal protection rules does not warrant, 
by itself, that there will be actions taken by the judiciary in that specific country. As far as 
legal origins are concerned, we find that, compared to other legal origins, the IPOs from the 
German civil law countries, which provide weak shareholder protection, have significantly 
larger underpricing. For IPOs from common law countries, the underpricing is lower, but the 
result is not statistically significant. This result weakly supports La Porta et al. (1998) that 
common law countries have stronger investor protections.  
We contribute to the literature in the following two ways. First, we provide new 
evidence in law and finance literature by showing the influence of legal framework from the 
home country on those foreign firms’ IPOs in the U.S. In addition, following La Porta et al. 
(2000a), we provide evidence against the functional convergence hypothesis (Coffee, 1999 
and 2002). Even though the non-U.S. firms meet the sophisticated U.S. IPO regulations and 
requirements, their IPO underpricing is still influenced by the home-country’s legal and 
judicial systems.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. Section 
3 presents the research design and methodology. Section 4 discusses sample selection and 
descriptive statistics. We discuss the empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
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2.1 Law and Finance 
Researchers have long realized the importance of the legal system in corporate finance. 
For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests that “The firm is not an individual. It is 
a legal fiction ...”. In Footnote 14, they also add: “This view of the firm points up the 
important role which the legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially, 
the organization of economic activity.” However, the crucial assumption in the traditional 
“law and economics” perspective that the juridical system perfectly protects shareholders 
and enforces elaborate contracts cannot be taken for granted in many countries. (La Porta et 
al. 2000a).  
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) emphasize that law does matter. La Porta et al. (1998) 
investigate 49 countries, categorized on the basis of the origins of their respective legal 
framework, with regards to the legal protection and the law enforcement. They find that legal 
rules systematically vary across countries with different legal origins. Judicial systems most 
favorable to shareholders, they indicate, are the ones found in countries with common law 
framework. Common law countries provide the best shareholder protection, while 
Scandinavian civil law counties offer the best law enforcement. La Porta et al. (1997) show 
that the legal system is a strong predictor of capital market development. Common law 
countries have the strongest investor protection and the most developed capital markets. On 
the contrary, countries with lower investor protection have smaller and narrower capital 
markets. In particular, the French civil law countries have the weakest investor protection 
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and the least developed capital markets. 
Following La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), researchers have investigated the differences 
in legal frameworks and how they affect different issues in corporate finance. Both La Porta 
et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) introduce theoretical models to study the 
effects of legal protection. In a model of a one-entrepreneur-controlled firm, La Porta et al. 
(2002) theoretically verify that: (1) countries with better shareholder protection have less 
expropriation of minority shareholders, (2) higher cash-flow (e.g., dividends) ownership is 
associated with less expropriation of minority shareholders. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) 
present a market equilibrium model to assess an entrepreneur’s decision to go public and 
how such a decision may be shaped by the legal environment.  
These theoretical models are supplemented with empirical studies which examine the 
relationship between law and finance. For instance, La Porta et al. (2000a) empirically 
demonstrate that legal protection for outside investors influences corporate governance in 
three major domains: ownership structure, financial market development and resource 
allocation. For the dividend policy, by using the investor protection quality as a proxy for 
agency cost level, La Porta et al. (2000b) find that in countries with better legal protection 
schemes for minority shareholders, firms pay higher dividends. Moreover, legally better 
protected shareholders are willing to trade the dividends for better investment opportunities, 
while poorly protected shareholders would take the dividends regardless of the future 
investment opportunities. In regard to financial market development, La Porta et al. (2006) 
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find that private enforcement plays a more important role than does public enforcement in 
the development of stock markets. Djankov et al. (2008) introduce the anti-self-dealing index 
as a new measure of the legal protection of minority shareholders. Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002) indicate that the enforcement of insider trading laws is associated with a reduction in 
the market cost of equity, while the existence of insider trading laws does not affect the cost 
of equity. 
2.2 IPO Underpricing 
Researchers have introduced different explanations for the IPO underpricing 
phenomenon. Most of the theoretical explanations are based on information asymmetries 
among market participants (Merton, 1987), though these approaches differ in the 
assumptions about which market participants have superior information to others. Rock 
(1986) proposes an adverse selection model, in which IPO underpricing is needed to 
maintain demands from uninformed traders. However, Rock’s model does not address the 
role of the degree of uncertainty (“ex ante uncertainty”) and the underwriter’s reputation, 
something that Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Carter and Manaster (1990) have introduced. 
Baron (1982) applies a principal-agent model to IPO underpricing with the assumption that 
the underwriters (agents) have information superior to that of the issuers (principals). The 
issuer underprices its shares to reduce the costs associated with soliciting honest advising 
from the underwriter. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) emphasize the role of information 
acquisition by investment bankers through “presale solicitations of interest.” In their auction 
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mechanism, underpricing is a way of compensating regular investors for revealing the 
private information. Leland and Pyle (1977) introduce the signaling model, which assumes 
the firm’s value is known to the issuer but not to investors. High-value firms use IPO 
underpricing as a signal to convince investors of their good quality. These firms will benefit 
from higher prices in seasoned offerings of additional shares in the future. 
With globalization, companies can list their equity shares on foreign stock exchanges 
to gain access to additional external financing. Investors face higher informational 
uncertainty when dealing with firms from countries other than theirs. Researchers have 
applied different information asymmetry models to explain foreign firms’ IPO underpricing. 
Francis et al. (2010), Blass and Yafeh (2001), Ejara and Ghosh (2004), and Bell et al. (2008) 
present evidence that various information asymmetry factors (e.g., market segmentation, 
investor recognition, and signaling of superior quality) affect foreign firms’ IPO 
underpricing in U.S. stock markets. However, none of these studies look at how a country’s 
legal environment affects information asymmetry among different concerned parties.  
2.3 The Functional Convergence Hypothesis 
Closely related with the study of law and finance, the functional convergence 
hypotheses (Coffee, 1999 and 2002; Fuerst, 1998; Stulz, 1999) argue that U.S. laws covering 
U.S.-listed foreign firms can potentially deter insiders from engaging in fraud and 
embezzlement in spite of the home country’s weak legal institutions. However, La Porta et 
al. (2000a), argue that though “functional convergence” may play a role in improving 
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investor protection, “such listing imposes only limited constraints on the insiders: although 
it improves disclosure, it typically does not give minority shareholders many effective rights.” 
They also argue that another limitation of the functional convergence is that assets located 
in foreign countries generally remain under the jurisdiction of these countries’ laws. 
Therefore, it is hard to protect the creditor rights if those countries have weak legal protection 
regimes. 
Literature provides mixed evidence for the functional convergence hypothesis. Mitton 
(2002) adopts ADR issuance to proxy disclosure quality and studies the performance of 398 
firms from five Asian countries during the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis. He finds 
evidence to support the argument that firms may opt for legal regimes that are more 
protective of minority shareholder rights if a country’s legal environment fails to protect 
these minority shareholders. Reese and Weisbash (2002) examine the hypothesis whether 
non-U.S. firms cross-list in the U.S. to increase minority shareholder protection. They 
conclude that the desire to protect shareholder rights is one reason for cross-listing. Doidge 
et al. (2004) find that the U.S. listing reduces the controlling shareholders’ expropriation, 
and thereby boosts opportunities for corporate growth (Tobin’s q). Doidge (2004) examines 
745 non-U.S. firms with a dual-class share structure. The empirical result is consistent with 
the notion that cross-listing in the U.S. increases firm value because it decreases the private 
benefits of control. 
However, we also find evidence against the functional convergence hypothesis. Siegel 
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(2005) provides empirical evidence that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
actually does not effectively enforce the law against cross-listed foreign firms. Fanto (1996) 
points out that the SEC failed to strictly realize the information disclosure requirements for 
foreign firms. Licht (2000) introduces the concept of managerial opportunism, which could 
play a significant role in foreign listing decisions. It is, therefore, difficult to claim explicitly 
that foreign listing is beneficial. Licht (2003) argues that the bonding role of cross-listing is 
greatly overstated because the regulatory regime to foreign issuers differs from the regime 
applied to domestic U.S. issuers. He finds that the foreign issuer regime “cuts corners” on 
the issues of corporate governance relating to corporate insiders. The SEC complements this 
“cutting corner” strategy with a “hands-off” informal policy of non-enforcement toward 
foreign issuers.  
 
3. Hypotheses and Research Design  
This study attempts to fill the gap in literature by extending the Law and Finance 
literature to IPO underpricing to investigate how a country’s legal institutions determine a 
firm’s cost of raising equity capital in the international market. In particular, we focus on the 
impact of the home country’s legal system on the underpricing of non-U.S. firms’ IPOs in 
the U.S. stock exchanges. 
When a foreign firm takes an IPO in the U.S., the “ex ante uncertainty” (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986) could be greater because it now includes both firm-level and macro-factors of 
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the home country. We expect the attributes of the home country’s legal system to provide 
valuable information on the “ex ante uncertainty” concerning the value of the IPO issuer. In 
other words, we expect that firms from countries with better legal qualities could reduce 
financing costs (e.g., lower degree of IPO underpricing) in the sense that an efficient home-
country’s legal framework will help to reduce the “ex ante uncertainty” associated with 
information asymmetry models.  
Law and finance literature introduce various measures of the country-level legal 
variables (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2006; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; and 
Djankov et al., 2008). For the purposes of our analysis, we categorize these variables into 
three groups: (1) variables measuring law enforcement; (2) variables measuring investor 
protection; and (3) legal origins. We formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the home-country law 
enforcement and IPO underpricing in the U.S. market. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the home-country investor 
protection and IPO underpricing in the U.S. market. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Companies from civil law countries have larger IPO underpricing. 
In addition, this study also provides an ideal setting to test the functional convergence 
hypothesis. The functional convergence hypothesis argues that foreign firms traded in the 
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U.S. markets are subject to regulations by U.S. legal institutions, which can potentially deter 
insiders from engaging in fraud activities regardless of how inefficient the home-country 
legal framework may be. Therefore, the functional convergence hypothesis predicts no 
influence from the issuer’s native legal framework to the IPO underpricing in the U.S. 
market if the U.S. legal institutions fully neutralize the effects of the home country’s different 
legal environment, and vice versa.    
To test our hypotheses, we run fixed effects regressions by including both the country-
level legal system variables and the firm-specific variables. 
iiii YCXBangUnderprici  0  (1) 
Where Underpricingi is the dependent variable, representing company i’s IPO 
underpricing. Underpricing is the price change measured from the IPO offering price to the 
market closing price on the first trading day. Xi is the vector of independent variables 
measuring the quality of company i’s home-country legal framework. Yi is the vector of 
control variables measuring the firm-specific factors. All the variables are defined in Table 
1. Panel A presents the country-level legal quality variables. Panel B shows variables related 
to the firm and offer features.  
[Place Table 1 here.] 
 
4. Data Source and Sample Construction 
We obtain foreign IPO data from 1991to 2008 from two sources. The first source is the 
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Security Data Company’s (SDC) new issue database. The second source is the ADR/ADS 
data from BNY Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and J.P.Morgan Chase. We do not include 
data from earlier years because foreign IPO data prior to 1991 are scarce.  
We include only IPOs listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX in our sample. We 
exclude firms incorporated in U.S., closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), 
and those IPOs with an offer price lower than $5. Moreover, for the ADR/ADS data, we 
exclude both Level I and Level II ADRs. Level I ADRs are not required to meet the SEC 
requirements or the U.S. GAAP rules. Level II ADRs cannot raise new equity in the U.S. 
markets. We also examine the issuers’ filing information with the SEC to ensure that the 
Level III ADRs are initially traded either in the U.S. only or in both the U.S. and the home 
country simultaneously. We further exclude IPOs from countries where information about 
the respective legal system is lacking or inaccessible. The final sample size contains 364 
IPOs from 1991 through 2008. 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables. Our sample includes 364 
foreign firms’ IPOs from 36 nations/regions. Panel A classifies countries by legal origin and 
presents means for the key variables. It shows that common law countries have better legal 
protection and better private law enforcement than civil law countries. In public law 
enforcement measures, common law countries have higher Public Enforcement Indexes and 
less corruption (CPI) than civil law nations, though the Scandinavian civil law nations have 
the least corruption. Panel A indicates that the legal protection variables and the law 
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enforcement variables are not necessarily correlated with each other. Panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics by nation. The average offer size is $141.99 million. The average degree 
of underpricing in our sample is 16%, median is 5%, and the standard deviation is 41%. 
Firms from Japan have the highest average IPO underpricing, 225%, while firms from 
Switzerland have the lowest, -16%.  
[Place Table 2 here.] 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables by year. The highest 
average IPO initial return is in 2000, 70%, while the lowest average IPO initial return is in 
2008, -1%. This is consistent with the IPO “hot issue year” phenomenon. The number of 
IPOs fluctuates over time. In Figure 1, we compare the number of IPOs by non-U.S. firms 
with the number of IPOs by U.S. firms for the period from 1991 to 2008. Both have similar 
fluctuation patterns over the study period. For the firm and offer variables, 62% of IPOs are 
listed in the NASDAQ market; 35% of issuers are high-tech companies; the average lead 
underwriter rank is 7.97; the average number of underwriters is 6.58; and 52% of issuers are 
from an emerging market. 
[Place Table 3 here.] 
[Place Figure 1 here.] 
Before moving into Section 5, we present the univariate test results in Table 4. Panel 
A of Table 4 shows that IPO underpricing for both ADR/ADS stocks and Ordinary/Common 
stocks are both positive and significant. Panel B of Table 4 reports that for firms from civil 
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law countries, the average IPO underpricing is 17.94%, which is higher than the average IPO 
underpricing of 14.70% for firms from common law countries. In the sub-sample of issuers 
from civil law countries, those from German civil law countries have the highest IPO 
underpricing (mean = 23.63%), and those from Scandinavian civil law countries have the 
lowest IPO underpricing (mean = 10.86%). 
 [Place Table 4 here.] 
 
5. Empirical Test Results 
5.1 IPO Underpricing and Law Enforcement Analysis 
Our first hypothesis is that IPO underpricing tends to be lower if the issuer’s home-
country law enforcement is more efficient. Table 5 presents regression results of IPO 
underpricing on various measures of law enforcement quality. 
In Columns 1 and 2, we focus on the measurements of private enforcement – disclosure 
requirements and liability standards, respectively. Although the results indicate that IPO 
firms with a better home-country private enforcement experience lower IPO underpricing, 
the relationship is not statistically significant. 
In Column 3 through Column 9, we look at public enforcement and the five 
components: supervisor characteristics index, rule-making power index, investigative 
powers index, orders index, and criminal sanction index. In Column 3, the coefficient on the 
public enforcement index is -0.402 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
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suggests that public enforcement would reduce IPO underpricing significantly and is 
consistent with the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between the home 
country’s law enforcement and foreign IPO underpricing. To better understand the effects of 
public enforcement on IPO underpricing, we further examine the five elements of the public 
enforcement index. Among these five components, the criminal sanction index, which covers 
criminal sanctions against violations of securities laws, is the only one that is statistically 
significant (Columns 8 and 9). Therefore, we conclude that the home-country’s criminal 
sanctions against directors, distributors, or accountants can effectively reduce ex-ante 
uncertainty, thus reducing information asymmetry and IPO underpricing. For the other four 
components, though negatively related with IPO underpricing, the coefficients are 
insignificant (Columns 4 through 7). 
In Column 10, we use corruption to proxy the law enforcement efficiency, assuming 
that corruption might undermine the deterrence of crime. We adopt the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) introduced by Transparency International. CPI ranks a country on a 
scale of 0 to 10, with a higher score indicating lower levels of corruption. The coefficient on 
the CPI is -0.06 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. It indicates that nations with 
lower corruption levels are more efficient in enforcing the law; thus, issuers from such 
nations tend to achieve significantly lower IPO underpricing. 
In Column 11, we report the regression result after adopting the insider-trading law 
enforcement dummy. The result shows that enforcement of insider-trading laws reduces IPO 
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underpricing; however, the relationship is not statistically significant. 
Finally, in Column 12 we regress IPO underpricing on all law enforcement variables – 
disclosure requirements, liability standards, public enforcement index, corruption (CPI), and 
insider-trading law enforcement, along with a group of control variables. The coefficients of 
the public enforcement index and CPI are significantly negative, which confirms better 
public law enforcement or less corruption would help reduce IPO underpricing. 
The above analyses have produced results supporting our first hypothesis that issuers 
from countries with more efficient law enforcement levels (with these proxied by public 
enforcement and corruption levels) tend to have lower IPO underpricing. The results suggest 
that there will be less information asymmetry (less underpricing) for IPOs coming from a 
country with better public law enforcement. In such an environment, where law enforcement 
against private benefit of insiders is effectively in place, insiders are less likely to expropriate 
minority shareholders.  
[Place Table 5 here.] 
5.2 IPO Underpricing and Investor Protection Analysis 
Our second hypothesis conjectures that IPO underpricing tends to be lower if the 
issuer’s home country has better investor legal protection. We adopt four variables to proxy 
the quality of investor protection: the anti-director rights index, the anti-self-dealing index, 
the creditor rights index, and the insider-trading law existence dummy. The first two 
variables measure how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against 
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managers or dominant shareholders. The creditor rights index proxies the level of creditor 
protection. Table 6 presents results of IPO underpricing on various measures of investor 
protection quality. 
Empirical results do not reveal any significant relationship between the level of IPO 
underpricing and the legal protection of investors. We interpret the results that investors 
prefer to see if the home country’s legal framework does indeed take legal actions against 
expropriations of shareholders because the existence of legal protection rules does not 
necessarily guarantee justice actions. 
[Place Table 6 here.] 
5.3 IPO Underpricing and Legal Origin Analysis 
Our last hypothesis proposes that IPO underpricing tends to be lower if the issuer’s 
home country has better investor legal system. The legal origin can proxy the quality of a 
legal system. La Porta et al. (1998) report that common law countries generally have better 
legal systems than civil law countries.  
Table 7 presents the results of IPO underpricing on legal origin. German legal origin 
is weakly positively related to IPO underpricing (Columns 3 and 5). Issuers from German 
civil law countries tend to have larger underpricing compared with those from common law 
countries or other civil law nations. This is consistent with La Porta et al. (1998), which 
shows the German civil countries are not particularly protective of shareholders (with the 
lowest anti-director rights index value).  
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To further investigate the issue, we create three dummy variables with different 
grouping methodologies and run regressions separately. The first dummy variable indicates 
whether the country has better shareholder protection, =1 for common law countries and 
Scandinavian civil law countries, 0 otherwise. The second dummy variable indicates whether 
the country has better creditor protection, =1 for common law countries and German civil 
law countries, 0 otherwise. The last dummy variable indicates whether the country has more 
efficient law enforcement, =1 for German and Scandinavian civil law countries, 0 otherwise. 
However, our results do not show statistically significant relationships between these 
different groups of origin-based legal frameworks and IPO underpricing. One possible 
explanation is that the legal origin variable covers a wider range of legal protection and law 
enforcement practices. The difference in legal protection or law enforcement among 
countries cannot be unambiguously represented by different legal origins. In other words, 
investors and underwriters may “place unequal weight on the various measures of investor 
protection and law enforcement” (Chen and Hao, 2011). 
[Place Table 7 here.] 
5.4 Robustness Check Tests 
To further assess the robustness of our results, we perform two alternative tests of our 
first hypothesis. 
First, we include the legal origin dummy into the regressions of the first hypothesis to 
examine whether the effects of law enforcement disappear after controlling legal origin. The 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248481 
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results are in Table 8. The coefficient on the public enforcement index is -0.378, and is 
statistically significant (Column 3). The coefficient on corruption (CPI) is -0.059, and is 
similarly statistically significant (Column 10).  
[Place Table 8 here.] 
Second, we adopt different proxies introduced in La Porta et al. (1998) to examine the 
robustness of our results on law enforcement: the efficiency of the judicial system and the 
level of per capita income (logarithm of GDP per capita). We regress IPO underpricing on 
these legal enforcement variables, along with the control variable. We find similar results in 
Table 9 to indicate that there is a negative relationship between the home-country law 
enforcement and IPO underpricing. 
[Place Table 9 here.] 
Overall, these results are consistent with our main findings that issuers from highly 
corrupted countries or countries with weak public law enforcement tend to have larger IPO 
underpricing. Furthermore, our results provide evidence against the functional convergence 
hypothesis. Even when a non-U.S. firm meets sophisticated U.S. regulations and goes public 
in a U.S. stock exchange, its IPO underpricing is still influenced by its respective home-
country’s legal and judicial institutions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As capital markets have developed internationally, the location of trade has become an 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248481 
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increasingly important choice for firms. It is well-recognized that legal protections of 
shareholder interests can affect valuations and the ability to raise capital externally, for 
example, La Porta et. al (1997, 1998, 1999) and Grinblatt and Titman (1998). Coffee (1999) 
and Stulz (1999) have suggested that the ability to cross-list allows a firm to influence the 
legal regime under which one operates. This explanation for cross-listing complements the 
market segmentation explanations that have been discussed in the literature (see Miller 
(1999)). We provide additional evidence to law and finance literature by examining how 
legal systems affect IPO underpricing by looking at a sample of 364 non-U.S. firms’ IPOs 
in the U.S. over the period of 1991 - 2008.  
Our results suggest that foreign firms initially listed in U.S. markets are influenced by 
the quality of their respective home country law enforcement. First, firms from a highly 
corrupted country are associated with more IPO underpricing. Corruption undermines 
effective deterrence of crime, and, therefore, increases the “ex ante uncertainty” of IPO 
valuation. Second, IPO underpricing is lower if the home country’s public law enforcement 
is more efficient. Among the five components of the public enforcement index, the criminal 
sanction contributes significantly to reduce IPO underpricing.  
In contrast to the strong relationship between foreign IPO underpricing and the home-
country public law enforcement, we find no evidence that IPO underpricing is associated 
with home-country investor protection. We interpret the results as evidence that investors 
prefer to see if the home country’s legal framework does indeed take legal actions against 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248481 
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expropriations of investors, while the existence of legal protection rules does not necessarily 
warrant justice action. 
Third, where legal origins are concerned, we find that IPOs from German civil law 
countries tend to have more underpricing, while those from common law countries, the 
underpricing is lower, but the relationship is not significant. This may be because the legal 
origin variable covers a broad range of legal indicators and aspects, and, thus, cannot 
effectively reflect the differences in legal protection or law enforcement across nations. 
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) conjecture that common law is 
more suspicious of conflicted transactions than civil law, and subjects them to closer 
regulatory and legal scrutiny. The results of this paper are broadly consistent with that 
conjecture. For example, common law countries subject related-party transactions to greater 
disclosure requirements as well as to more arm’s-length approval than do civil law countries. 
These different approaches to the regulation of investor expropriation, appear to derive from 
long-standing legal principles, such as fiduciary duty, which over time are incorporated into 
the statutes that we actually observe. 
Since we have shown, even though when non-U.S. firms meet the sophisticated U.S. 
IPO regulations and requirements their IPO underpricing is still influenced by the home-
country’s legal institutions, our analysis supports the arguments against the functional 
convergence hypothesis. 
What should be the role of the law in addressing investor expropriation? One approach 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248481 
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is to do nothing, and to count on ‘the invisible hand’ - market forces to sort out the problem. 
Virtually no society uses this approach. At the other extreme, a society can prohibit 
conflicted transactions altogether: all dealings between a corporation and its controllers, or 
any other entity these controllers also control, could be banned by law. Yet no society finds 
it practical to use this approach either, perhaps because in many instances related-party 
transactions actually make economic sense.  
So what do we do? If we take the evidence in this paper, the most crucial message for 
the improvement of regulation of corporate governance perhaps is that laissez-faire—the 
strategy of no public involvement at all—does not lead to more developed financial markets. 
The public sector clearly has a central role to play.  
Future study may look at the constituents of each legal variable to shed further light on 
what legal parameters might be more significant in reducing the costs of external financing. 
Another area that warrants further investigation is whether the home-country legal 
institutions affect decisions related with IPO share type or the IPO listing market, or if 
foreign issuers consider these two parameters simultaneously in order to maximize their 
benefits in IPO. 
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Table 4. Univariate test on IPO underpricing 
Average IPO underpricing by share type or by legal origin. The sample includes 364 foreign 




Panel A. Different types of security
Share type Number of observations IPO underpricing mean t - Statistic Pr > |t|
ADR/ADS 185 0.1663 5.1484 < 0.0001
Ordinary/Common 179 0.1629 5.8011 < 0.0001
All 364 0.1646 7.6847 < 0.0001
Panel B. Legal origin
Legal origin Number of observations IPO underpricing mean t - Statistic Pr > |t|
Common - UK 166 0.1470 6.8947 < 0.0001
Civil - FR 105 0.1350 5.8483 < 0.0001
Civil - GE 88 0.2363 3.2009 0.0019
Civil -SC 5 0.1086 2.7078 0.0537
Civil 198 0.1794 5.1089 < 0.0001
All 364 0.1646 7.6847 < 0.0001
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Table 6. The effects of investor legal protection on IPO underpricing 
Results of fixed-effects regressions on the impact of investor legal protection on IPO 
underpricing. In each regression, the dependent variable is the degree of underpricing. From 
column 1 to 7, the key independent variables are different aspects of legal protection. In 
column 8, we pool all the different aspects of legal protection together and run the regression.  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Anti-director rights (antidir) 0.006 0.022
(0.40) (0.85)
Creditor rights (cr) -0.010 0.001
(-0.54) (0.06)






IT law existance (it_ex) -0.033 -0.045
(-0.12) (-0.18)
Log(size) 0.041 0.044 0.051 0.049 0.046 0.047 0.043 0.044
(1.44) (1.46) (1.57) (1.55) (1.41) (1.43) (1.43) (1.39)
NQ_dummy 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.076 0.074 0.078 0.068 0.091
(1.35) (1.35) (1.28) (1.32) (1.29) (1.34) (1.24) (1.50)
High-tech_dummy 0.034 0.055 0.052 0.055 0.056 0.058 0.053 0.036
(0.72) (1.14) (1.02) (1.07) (1.08) (1.12) (1.11) (0.68)
Underwriter rank -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.004
(-0.17) (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.12) (0.01) (-0.27)
No. of underwriters -0.006* -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(1.68) (-1.41) (-1.42) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-1.30) (-1.36) (-1.57)
Emerging_dummy -0.030 -0.015 -0.017 -0.028 -0.018 -0.036 -0.011 -0.032
(-0.65) (-0.32) (-0.34) (-0.56) (-0.34) (-0.68) (-0.23) (-0.64)
Constant -0.173 -0.184 -0.285 -0.284 -0.204 -0.248 -0.172 -0.123
(-0.62) (-0.89) (-1.18) (-1.22) (-0.84) (-1.01) (-0.49) (-0.27)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.120 0.091 0.091 0.094 0.089 0.092 0.095 0.105
Observations 287 360 339 339 339 339 363 263
*: p  < 10%; **: p < 5%; ***: p  < 1%
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Table 9. The effects of law enforcement on IPO underpricing 
Robustness of the impact of law enforcement on IPO underpricing. We run fixed-effects 
regressions with different proxies to measure law enforcement, judiciary efficiency; and 
logarithm of GDP per capita, following La Porta et al. (1998). In both regressions, the 
dependent variable is the degree of underpricing. The key independent variables are different 
proxies for law enforcement.  
 
  
1 2 3 4
Corruption (CPI) -0.036* -0.053*
(-1.87) (-1.84)
Judiciary efficiency -0.007 0.034
(-0.38) (1.06)
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.058* -0.005
(-1.66) (-0.08)
Log(size) 0.057 0.039 0.041 0.058
(1.53) (1.37) (1.39) (1.59)
NASDAQ dummy 0.110 0.080 0.081 0.118
(1.63) (1.41) (1.48) (1.63)
High-tech dummy 0.074 0.038 0.048 0.057
(1.26) (0.78) (1.01) (0.91)
Underwriter rank 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.03) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.17)
No. of underwriters -0.006 -0.006* -0.004 -0.007*
(-1.26) (-1.66) (-1.17) (-1.66)
Emerging market dummy -0.135 -0.045 -0.070 -0.156*
(-1.56) (-0.94) (-1.19) (-1.92)
Constant -0.015 -0.070 0.333 -0.080
(-0.06) (-0.22) (0.87) (-0.13)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.105 0.120 0.103 0.129
Observations 291 287 363 219
*: p  < 10%; **: p < 5%; ***: p  < 1%
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